In a July 17, 2026, X post, conservative commentator Joel Berry (former Babylon Bee editor and producer for The Jeremy Boreing Show) declared: “The younger generations will soon realize the anti-Israel stuff was an op just like BLM and COVID. When that occurs, there will be a massive Gen Z pro-Israel reaction.”
Berry frames widespread criticism of Israel’s actions in Gaza (and broader Middle East policy) as a manufactured campaign destined for the same backlash that eroded support for Black Lives Matter after 2020 or COVID-era restrictions. He envisions a swift, dramatic reversal among young people.The data tells a different story—one of entrenched generational divergence that shows little sign of reversing “soon.”
Current Polling Reality
Recent surveys reveal a clear pattern: younger Americans, particularly those aged 18-29 or 18-34, hold significantly more favorable or sympathetic views toward Palestinians than Israelis. A May 2026 Pew Research Center survey found that among U.S. adults under 30:58% have a favorable view of the Palestinian people. Only 32% have a favorable view of the Israeli people.
This gap widens dramatically among young Democrats (72% favorable toward Palestinians vs. 26% toward Israelis). Even young Republicans show a sharp reversal from prior years, now viewing both groups at roughly similar levels around 40%.
Gallup’s 2026 data reinforce the shift: For the first time in decades of tracking, Americans overall sympathize more with Palestinians (41%) than Israelis (36%). Among those aged 18-34, the margin is stark—53% sympathize more with Palestinians versus just 23% with Israelis, a record low for the latter.
Other polls echo this: Harvard Youth Poll respondents under 30 viewed Israel more as a “burden” than a benefit to the U.S. by a wide margin. Multiple surveys show unfavorable views of Israel reaching 60%+ among those under 35 or 50 in recent years, with the steepest declines among younger cohorts.
Why the “Op” Analogy Falls Flat
Berry compares anti-Israel sentiment to BLM or COVID policies, implying both were top-down operations that collapsed under scrutiny or real-world consequences. BLM’s peak support in 2020 faded amid rising crime in some cities, “defund the police” experiments, and visible excesses. COVID restrictions faced backlash from lockdowns’ economic and social costs, shifting risk assessments, and policy overreach.
- The Israel-Palestine issue differs in key ways: It taps into deep, pre-existing narratives around colonialism, occupation, and human rights that have been taught in universities and amplified on social media (especially TikTok and Instagram) for years.
- Exposure to graphic footage from Gaza has been constant and visceral for young users, creating a powerful emotional frame that polls suggest has solidified rather than eroded views.
- Unlike temporary policies, this involves a long-running conflict with competing historical claims, Oct. 7 atrocities, Hamas’s role, and high civilian casualties—issues where young people appear to weigh evidence differently than older generations.
Claims of foreign “ops” (e.g., Qatar-funded campus activism or Iranian influence) exist and deserve scrutiny, but they do not explain the broad, cross-poll consistency in generational polling data. Public opinion shifts on foreign policy often reflect cohort effects that persist for decades, as seen with views on Vietnam or Iraq.
This does not even take into account the cratering support for dispensationalism in the church among young Christians.
A Prediction Without Empirical Grounding
Berry suggests the “anti-Israel stuff” is already looking “long in the tooth” and that grifters are pivoting. Yet as of mid-2026, major polls conducted months into ongoing conflicts show no rebound in youth support for Israel. If anything, the generational divide remains one of the starkest in American politics on this issue.
Even among young Republicans and conservatives, support has softened compared to older cohorts. A massive, rapid “pro-Israel reaction” would require not just skepticism of current activism but a fundamental reversal of how millions of young Americans process the conflict, something polls give no indication is imminent.
Public opinion can shift. Events matter. Compelling arguments about Israel’s security needs, Hamas’s ideology, or rejectionism have not yet moved the needle substantially among Gen Z and younger Millennials in aggregate. Dismissing contrary views as an “op” risks underestimating how sincerely many young people hold them, as opposed to going along with the crowd.
Berry’s forecast reads more like a hopeful projection than a data-driven analysis. The evidence points to a durable generational realignment on Israel-Palestine, not an impending snap-back. Wishing for a “massive Gen Z pro-Israel reaction” does not make it likely in the near term. Reality, per the polls, remains stubbornly resistant to that narrative. And the Israelis realize this, and thus they have spent hundreds of millions to reverse the course to no avail.
